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The usual understanding of the one-many problem 
today: The Dispersal Problem 
 When we use a term such as ‘ox’, are we 
referring to some one thing (‘oxhood’) which 
has a strange ‘spread-out’ character across 
all individual oxen? 
 Is oxhood one or many?
 Or even (medievals) ‘some quantity in 
between’ (??)
The Dispersal Problem
 Dilemma (Parmenides). If  a Form is:
y many, why is it that if an ox is destroyed, oxhood
itself is not diminished?
y one, how is it that “one and the same thing exists 
as a whole at the same time in many separate 
individuals, and will therefore be in a state of 
separation from itself” ?
 This dilemma has seemed to many 
philosophers to render the whole idea of 
universals or Forms incoherent.
Contemporary (Reified 
Hylomorphic) Responses to the 
Dispersal Problem: 
 Realism (Armstrong): particulars and 
universals exist: Oxhood is one over 
many.
 Nominalism (everyone else): only 
particulars exist. Oxhood is a many.
 What both views share: 
y Reification of particularity and generality into 
particulars and universals. 
y The role of metaphysics is merely to state 
‘what there is’ (list of ontological ingredients)
“Ontological Compositionality”
 The most fundamental ingredients of the 
Universe are always combined and 
recombined in world-making without 
changing their natures. 
 3 is always 3, a physical object is always a 
physical object, the property white is always 
the property white, no matter in what state 
of affairs they may be found.
 David Lewis assumes this without question 
in his “Humean Supervenience” 
The Philebus, Setting the Scene: 
 Often seen as a late dialogue. One of the most 
difficult and abstract (Rosen: “Technical 
eccentricity”)
 3 protagonists: Socrates, Philebus (‘love-boy’,  
‘lover of youth’), Protarchus (‘first principle’)
 Key Question: Which is superior in human life: 
Knowledge or Pleasure?
 Answer: Superior to both is the correct balance or 
mixture between the two.
 It therefore raises the one-many problem entirely 
within the realm of Forms. A possibility that the 
contemporary analytic (reified hylomorphic) 
approach cannot even see. 
The Philebus, Setting the Scene: 
 Early in the dialogue one-many issues arise. For Socrates 
begins by noting that the heterogeneity of pleasures will 
complicate their rank-ordering task:
“…surely she [Aphrodite, pleasure’s goddess] takes the most 
varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the 
intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has 
pleasure in his very temperance…” 
 Protarchus is willing to accept this at face value. But 
Socrates draws his attention to its philosophical perplexity:
“For that the many are one and the one many are amazing 
statements, and can be easily disputed, whichever side of 
the two one may want to defend.” (14c8-10). 
 However Socrates immediately makes a distinction 
between more and less serious one-many problems….
Non Serious One-Many Problems:
 Protarchus: how a single person has many 
opposite characteristics in different contexts, 
such as tall/short, heavy/light, and in this way is 
“many ‘mes’”. (Inconsistent Properties Problem)
 Socrates: “…when someone who first 
distinguishes a person’s limbs and parts asks 
your agreement that all these parts are identical 
with that unity, but then exposes you to ridicule 
because of the monstrosities you have to admit, 
that the one is many and indefinitely many, and 
again that the many are only one thing (15e1-5)” 
(Physical Combination Problem)
Socrates dismisses these as “childish and trivial but a serious 
impediment to argument if one takes them on” (14d7-e1) 
Serious One-Many Problems:
where “...the one is not taken from the things that come to be or 
perish...”.
Socrates: “…when someone tries to posit man as one, 
or ox as one, or the beautiful as one, and the good 
as one, zealous concern with divisions of these 
unities and the like gives rise to controversy…Firstly 
whether one ought to suppose that there are any 
such unities truly in existence. Then again…whether 
each one of them is always one and the same, 
admitting neither of generation nor of destruction; 
and whether it remains most definitely one and the 
same, even though it is afterwards found again 
among the things that come to be and are unlimited, 
so that it finds itself as one and the same in one and 
many things at the same time. And must it be treated 
as dispersed and multiplied or as entirely separated 
from itself, which would seem most impossible of 
all?”  (15a4-b9)
Sounds a lot like the Dispersal Problem. But is the instantiation relation the only 
relation invoked here? And is it restricted to Forms dispersing over particulars…? 
The Genus-Species Problem
 Constance Meinwald argues the passage also 
makes reference to the way a Form is one while 
being divisible into many species and sub-species. 
(Genus-Species Problem)
We “see the problem as arising from both positing 
monads and dividing them while denying that they 
admit generation and destruction.” 
 How is ‘mammal’ one in ‘cat’, ‘dog’ and ‘fox’?
 Note genus-species relation is quite different from i) 
instantiation relation, ii) part-whole relation
 Meinwald’s hypothesis seems vindicated by what 
Socrates goes on to say next…
The Promethean Method
 When Protarchus asks for an answer 
to the one-many problem, Socrates
replies by describing a method of 
inquiry, as follows:
“It is a gift from gods to men…hurled 
down from heaven by some 
Prometheus along with a most dazzling 
fire. And the people of old, superior to 
us and living in closer proximity to the 
gods, have bequeathed us this tale, 
that whatever is said to be consists of 
one and many, having limit and 
unlimitedness naturally together in 
them…”  (16c5-9)
The Promethean Method
 We begin any inquiry by laying down “one idea”. After that:
“…we must look for two, as the case would have it, or if not, for 
three or some other number. And we must treat every one 
of those further unities in the same way, until it is not only 
established of the original unit that it is one, many and 
unlimited, but also how many kinds it is…Only then is it 
permitted to release each kind of unity into the unlimited 
and let it go (16d5-e3).
 E.g.: I am interested in studying human laws. I begin by 
identifying The Law as my (one) object.
 I could then start collecting every law ever written, to 
study them. This would be proceeding straight to the infinite. 
But would be impossibly confusing and inefficient ….
The Promethean Method
 More useful would be to make some 
intermediate (plural) divisions of my subject matter:
The Law
Law000001, Law000002, Law000003…Law1700000…..Law9999999
Contract 
Law Property 
Law
Criminal 
Law
British Law Asian Law
The Combination Problem
 However yet another one-many problem, arguably 
even more important, may be discerned in the text.
 The dialogue’s conclusion is that the Good Life is a 
mixed life which must contain both Pleasure and 
Knowledge, balanced correctly.
 If 2 puddles are combined, the result is just one 
puddle. But in the Good Life Knowledge and 
Pleasure are both still present – the liver of such a 
life does not cease to know or to enjoy. 
 How can a Form contain 2 other Forms within it, 
and still be one thing?
 We may call this an Eidetic Combination Problem.
Why the Eidetic Combination Problem is 
‘serious’, while the Physical Combination 
Problem is not
 The human body is a combination of arms, legs, a head, 
and other parts... Why doesn’t this diversity mean it is 
subject to the one-many problem? 
 The crucial difference is that the complexity of physical 
objects can be analysed by means of their genesis, and 
(thus) their spatial arrangement. 
 These allow independent means of individuating such 
entities. My head is my head and not a separate object 
because spatially integrated wtih my other body-parts.
 Forms however were not generated and are not arranged 
in space. The only individuation they have is eidetic. This 
is why the one-many problem is harder for them.
Summary:Three One-Many Problems, 
purely Eidetic (in the realm of Forms).
1. The Dispersal Problem: How can a Form be one 
while dispersed throughout its participants? (E.g. 
How is goodness one in military valour and 
compassionate charity work?)
2. The Genus-Species Problem: How can a Form 
be one when divisible into species? (E.g. How is 
mammalhood one in cats, dogs and foxes?)
3. The Combination Problem: How can a Form be 
one when a mixture of disparate and unrelated 
ingredients? (E.g. How is the Good Life one yet 
containing both Knowledge and Pleasure?)
These issues cannot be distinguished in 
frameworks such as D.M. Armstrong’s
Peras (finite, limited)
 We will now look at solutions offered in the 
dialogue to the one-many problem
 When Protarchus asks Socrates for his solution 
to the one-many problem, the latter answers 
(16d1-2) that everything that is is structured in 
terms of peras and apeiron.
 Although peras is sometimes translated as 
“finite” (e.g. Jowett), it also means “limit” or 
“boundary”. 
 This provides the beginnings of a metaphysics 
of how something can be both one and many
Peras (finite, bounded)
 A boundary demarcates something: it 
creates an edge where one thing 
finishes and another begins.
 A boundary encloses something, and 
what it encloses or contains is brought 
together, and distinguished from what is 
without, in virtue of being bound by the 
boundary. 
 Thus “limit” or “boundary” seems to give 
us a principle of unity.
But this is not the whole story……
Apeiron (infinite, unlimited)
 Although peras acts to draw a boundary around 
an object, there is no guarantee that what is 
within the boundary is genuinely unified. 
(Consider a bundle of sticks tied together with 
twine. Remove it and they fall apart…)
 We need not only to be able to bind things, but 
to do it in such a way that there are no gaps 
between them, and somehow still keep the 
things which are joined sufficiently distinct. 
 With only peras as our metaphysical principle, 
there would be no true ‘one’. It is not possible to 
make real things purely out of boundaries.
Apeiron (infinite, unlimited)
 Apeiron means “unlimited”, “indefinite”, 
“infinite” or “boundless”.
 It is thus a principle capable of 
explicating the lack of gap between 
things which are joined. It might be seen 
to perform a double role, ensuring:
y ‘Intra-object unity’
y ‘Trans-object unity’     as follows……
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The two uses of apeiron really one
 We may understand this use of apeiron as 
providing ‘trans-object unity’ from the point 
of view of D. 
 However from the point of view of A, B, and 
C, the Forms which are thus stabilized are 
themselves further ones. So it provides an 
‘intra-object unity’ for them.
 From this convergence between the two 
uses of apeiron profound consequences 
follow…
The two uses of apeiron really one
 Arguably a key point of Plato’s realism is that 
spatial individuation is relatively trivial − it is 
eidetic individuation against a background 
continuum of Forms that gives us the more 
profound grasp on reality.
 In this sense, to return to the wording of the 
Parmenides, although its instances may seem 
scattered, when understood rightly a Form is 
not “in a state of separation from itself”. 
 It is unified eidetically, and that is the unification 
that matters.
The “Dispersal Problem” has now been (dis)solved via a 
change in perspective
The Fourfold Division
 After outlining the Promethean Method 
Socrates elaborates peras and apeiron
still further in a metaphysical discussion 
which has come to be known as the 4 
fold division.
 The levels are as follows…
The Fourfold Division
Cause
Mixed Class
Peras
Apeiron
That which admits 
more or less (e.g. 
hotter-colder)
Things which “admit 
their opposites” (e,g, 
equality)
Peras ‘drawn onto’ 
Apeiron = “number 
and measure”. 
Intelligibility. Forms
??
The Fourfold Division
 Why the Fourth level?
“Every way of blending whatsoever and of
whatever kind, if it does not get measure
and the commensurate nature, destroys of
necessity the things being blended and first
itself, for anything of the kind is not even a
blending but truly an unblended mishmash,
and on each and every occasion proves to
be really and truly for those in possession
of it a smashup.” (64e2-4)
 This is a direct challenge to ontological 
compositionality
Translation by 
Bernadete here
The Fourfold Division
 True mixture is much more than mere 
concatenation.
 The presence or absence of harmony (“health”) 
can change everything in a mixture, in a way 
which is not at all like Lego (where one can 
rearrange the parts in all kinds of ways but they 
remain the same).
 Consider for example a person's character. It is 
possible that just a touch more pride, turning the 
person to hubris, might spoil all their other good 
qualities.
 The role of the cause is to provide a normative 
realism about combinations.
Systemic realism
 We are now working with an irreducibly systemic 
perspective on realism about Universals.
 In this light here are some interesting quotes from 
Charles Peirce:
“…where ordinary logic considers only a single, special 
kind of relation, that of similarity – a relation too of a 
particular featureless and insignificant kind, the logic 
of relatives imagines a relation in general to be 
placed. Consequently, in place of the class which is 
composed of a number of individual object or facts 
brought together in ordinary logic by means of their 
relation of similarity, the logic of relatives considers 
the system, which is composed of objects brought 
together by any kind of relations whatsoever.” (p. 156-
7, Reasoning and the Logic of Things (RLT)). 
Systemic Realism
“The dialogue of the Sophist… gives reasons for 
abandoning the Theory of Ideas which imply that 
Plato himself had come to see, if not that the 
Eternal Essences are continuous, at least, that 
there is an order of affinity among them, such as 
there is among Numbers. Thus, at last, the Platonic 
Ideas became Mathematical Essences, not 
possessed of Actual Existence but only of a 
Potential Being quite as Real..." (p. 115, RLT)
“The existing Universe…is an offshoot from, or an 
arbitrary determination of, a world of Ideas, a 
Platonic world....” (p. 258, RLT) 
 How is the potential being of Ideas realised?
 Philosophical dialogue and inquiry.
 Hence the intriguing final exchange of the 
dialogue:
Socrates: And will you let me go?
Protarchus: There is a little which yet remains, 
and I will remind you of it, for I am sure you will 
not be the first to go away from an argument.
 Rosen: “Socrates was free to begin the 
investigation of the good life, but he is not free 
to terminate it”…
Systemic Realism
Conclusion
 We need a much deeper appreciation of 
Plato’s realism. 
 Ontological combinatorialism precisely 
begs the question against the reality of 
relations. 
 We need a truer, more objective debate 
on this question. 
